





 Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II 
 University of the Basque Country 
 Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83 





DFAE-II WP Series 
 
 
Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza,  
María Paz Espinosa & Luis M. Miller  
 
Personal identity 













b, María Paz Espinosa













                                                    
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the Centro de Estudios Andaluces 
(S0CH2.05/43) and MCI (SEJ2007-06309/ECO and SEJ2006-00959/SOCI). Special thanks to participants in 
the Spring Workshop of the Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics (Jena, 2007).  
 
a IESA-CSIC, Campo Santo de los Mártires 7, 14004, Córdoba (Spain); E-mail: faguiar@iesa.csic.es. 
  
b  Departamento  de Teoría  Económica,  Universidad  de  Granada,  Campus  de la  Cartuja,  18011,  Granada 
(Spain); E-mail: pbg@ugr.es. 
 
c  Departamento  de  Fundamentos  del  Análisis  Económico  II,  Universidad  del  País  Vasco,  Avenida 
Lehendakari Aguirre, 83, 48015, Bilbao (Spain); E-mail: mariapaz.espinosa@ehu.es.  
 
d Centre for Experimental Social Sciences, Nu_eld College, University of Oxford, New Road OX1 1NF, 
Oxford (United Kingdom); E-mail: luis.miller@nu_eld.ox.ac.uk 
 Personal identity
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June 8, 2009
Abstract
This paper aims to analize the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it
starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Con-
sidering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses
on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity
enters in individuals’ utility function when facing a Dictator Game decision is then
presented. Finally, this ‘identity-based’ utility function is studied experimentally. The
experiment allows us to study the main parameters of the model, suggesting that we
should move with caution when attributing identities to individuals.
Keywords: personal identity, dictator game, game theory, experiments.
11 Introduction
Until recently, little attention was given to the concept of identity in economics. Many
have attempted to explain this lack of interest by appealing to the traditional concept of
the homo economicus driven by self-interest (Basu 2006; Davis 2003; Horst et al. 2006; Sen
1985, 2004, 2006). Thus, for example, to explain the so-called wealth gap between blacks
and whites in the United States, standard economics treats a radically individual self-
interested ‘taste for discrimination’ as an argument in the utility function (Becker 1971),
as if individuals were not embedded in a social context in which race and racism determine
the conduct and the economic outcomes of blacks and whites, regardless of their respective
tastes for discrimination (Arrow 1998; Austen-Smith and Fryer 2005; Basu 2005; Darity
et al. 2006; Mason 2001). Yet not only race, but sex, social class, culture, language or
personal loyalties towards members of the group or groups to which an individual belongs
also have a decisive weight in economic behavior (BØnabou and Tirole 2007; Davis 2003;
Luchini and Teschl 2005).
According to this standpoint, which is commonly shared by such disciplines as sociology
or social psychology and which is already held to be true in economics, people’s identity,
their sense of self, is shaped in the heart of the groups with which the individual identi￿es.
The group can therefore have more weight than the individual and determine norms for
acceptation and rejection or for solidarity and competence that cannot always be attributed
solely to sel￿sh behavior.
In an article that can be considered the predecessor to the introduction of identity in
economics, George Akerlof shows, for example, how wealthy parents who try to maximize
the economic bene￿ts of their children, consider it advantageous to teach them to identify
with members of their own class and to be loyal and honest with them, ‘even though
these traits may in some circumstances cause the individual to engage in nonmaximizing
behavior’ (Akerlof 1983, p. 61). As Akerlof points out, individuals cannot identify with
their class without being loyal, but this group loyalty can be detrimental to them. A vast
amount of social psychology literature demonstrates that individuals may indeed incur
enormous personal costs to themselves in bene￿t of the group to which they belong (Dawes
et al. 1990).
1Departing from the empirical evidence on the weight of social identity in economic and
non-economic conduct, George Akerlof and Rachel Kranton were the ￿rst to introduce the
concept of identity in an economic analysis (Akerlof and Kranton 2000). In Akerlof and
Kranton’s proposal, the utility of individual i is a function of i’s actions, the actions of
others and of identity I or i’s self-image. On the one hand, identity is based on the social
category that others attribute to a given person, while on the other it is based on the degree
to which the traits i of i coincide with the ideal social category that others attribute to
her, which is indicated by prescription P (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, p. 719). Social
identity therefore involves accommodating one’s own image and thus one’s own actions to
that ideal. Insofar as individuals internalize the code of conduct linked to a prescribed
behavior, feelings of anxiety and cognitive dissonance may be evoked when violating the
prescription. Likewise, the person may have a higher sense of self when accommodating
the behavior prescribed by the reference group. Nonetheless, as Akerlof and Kranton point
out, general agreement does not exist regarding social categories and prescriptions, thus
providing the individual the option to choose her total or partial identity.
The pioneer article by Akerlof and Kranton led to an authentic boom in research on identity
and economics -giving rise to the creation of a new ￿eld of study: the economics of identity
(Kirman and Teschl 2004). Part of this research has applied, developed or modi￿ed the
model proposed by these authors in concrete studies on identity. Others have attempted to
propose new general models of behavior to include identity in an economic analysis. Akerlof
and Kranton’s own studies are among the former type. In the ￿rst paper in which they
apply their model (Akerlof and Kranton 2002), the authors demonstrate that students’
performance depends on their identity, that is, the social category that is attributed to
them (‘crowd leader’ , ‘nerds’ or burnouts’ ) and how they accommodate their self-image
to this category. In order to maximize their utility, students must not only maximize their
e￿ort, but must ￿t into a category. In a second study (Akerlof and Kranton 2005), they
show how workers’ e￿ciency improves when they identify with their company.
Other examples of studies applied to concrete cases in which the economic outcomes of
identity are expressly analyzed, include studies on racial con￿ict (Basu 2005; Benjamin et
al. 2006; Bodenhorn and Ruebeck 2003; Darity et al. 2006; Mason 2001), religious identity
(Minkler and Cosgel 2004), trust and identity (G￿th et al. 2008), economic development
(Basu 2006), identity and micro￿nance programs (Chatterjee and Sarangi 2004), consump-
tion of symbolic goods (Dolfsma 2004; Starr 2004), political integration (Wichardt 2008a),
2identity and cooperative social norms (Wichardt 2008b), or law and economics of identity
(Hill 2005).
There are much fewer general models. One of the most notable is the evolutionary model
by BØnabou and Tirole (2007), who present a general theoretical model to explain people’s
beliefs about their deepest values and how preferences for identity, dignity and taboos
interfere in these beliefs. Davis (2007), on the other hand, transforms Akerlof and Kranton’s
utility function by making personal identity a function of individual utility, which is at the
same time a function of social identity. Given that we all have multiple social identities,
personal identity implies the capacity to choose from among numerous social categories
according to their utility.
In spite of the unquestionable interest that these investigations arouse, it is striking that
although the concept is questioned by other disciplines, particularly sociology and political
science, economics addresses the concept of social identity and does not take into account
these widespread criticisms. The main criticisms regarding the concept of social identity
can be grouped into three categories.
a. Conceptual ambiguity
The meanings of ‘identity’ abound in the sociological, political science and psychological
literature. Identity can be people’s concept of who they are and how they relate with others;
biological aspects which acquire a socially constructed meaning of identity (race, gender);
identi￿cation with national, cultural or linguistic symbols; role-speci￿c understanding and
expectations about self; cognitive schemata by which the individual knows the world; the
prescriptive representation of political actors; expressivist behavior or non-instrumental
modes of action; the unstable, multiple and fragmented contemporary self, etc. (Brubaker
and Cooper 2000; Fearon 1999). Thus, ‘the term ￿identity￿ is made to do a great deal
of work’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 8). In economics the term is made to do a
great deal of work too. In the recent literature on economics and identity we ￿nd that
identity is understood as a payo￿, as a set of social categories, as an interiorized social
norm, as the belief in profound personal values, as a perceptual lens or as non-instrumental
deontological elements of action (Hill 2005; Davis 2006). These myriad de￿nitions pose
reasonable doubts as to the usefulness of a concept which is at best vague and capable
3of encompassing multiple de￿nitions and on the causal tie between identity and action
(Aguiar and de Francisco 2002; Bicchieri 2002; MacInnes 2004; Obershall and Kim 1996).
b. Categories of practice vs. categories of analysis
It is often di￿cult to distinguish if identity refers to the way in which people understand
or see themselves in everyday life and in their social, political or economic practice, or if
identity refers to an analytical concept embedded in a theory of social action. In other
words, identity is not distinguished so much as a category of social practice as a category
of analysis (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 4). For example, when Akerlof and Kranton
analyze the in￿uence of the feminist movement in the job market, they mix both categories.
This is certainly legitimate, but it is convenient to clarify the di￿erence, otherwise it is
impossible to know if we are referring to identity as a category attributed by the researcher
to the individual or if we are referring to identity as a true process of self-categorization.
c. Social identity does not exhaust personal identity
In￿uenced by sociology and social psychology, the economics of identity has chie￿y focused
on social identity, while overlooking personal identity. When identity is de￿ned as a process
of social or intragroupal identi￿cation, people are considered to be ‘embodiments of group
prototypes rather than as independent individuals’ (Davis 2006). Personal identity thus
vanishes in a hypersocialized concept of individual. But given the notably widespread
consensus that people have multiple identities, it is necessary to appeal to individual or
personal identity as a reference for the individual who re￿exively chooses what she wants to
be. That is, if the social identity in Akerlof and Kranton’s model involves ￿tting individual
action to a social category that others attribute to us, personal identity would imply ￿tting
the action to the image that one has or wishes to have about oneself (Sen 2004; Teschl
2006). This is a complex process full of ambiguities and incoherences that can a￿ect
identi￿cation with others. For this reason, as Davis points out, ‘without some account of
the ￿bearer￿ of a set of social identities, saying that an individual identi￿es with others is
largely an empty claim’ (Davis 2007).
Bearing in mind these criticisms, in the present article we aim to study the growing interest
in the issue of personal identity by means of a dictator game (DG) in order to contribute
some insight into the ‘bearer’ of social identities. Identity is used here as an analytical
4category, since individuals do not make express references to their identity or anything
of the kind nor is it something they talk about. The issue of identity (in the analytical
or attributed sense) emerges when subjects in a DG are made to re￿ect upon what they
should give and what they should keep -the fairest decision in their opinion- following the
action, that is, once they have given an amount of money or have kept it all for themselves.
Given that this is a question of coherency between what the subjects have done and what
they believe they should do in a context in which information about others is lacking
(i.e. the identity of the recipients) and in which social identity does not come into play
(in a standard DG the actions of experimental subjects are not channeled to ￿t to a
social prescription P), we ￿nd ourselves before an instance of personal identity. As social
psychologist John Turner points out,
Personal identity refers to self-categories which de￿ne the individual as a
unique person in terms of their individual di￿erences from other (ingroup)
persons. Social identity refers to social categorization of self and others, self-
categories which de￿ne the individual in terms of his or her shared similarities
with members of certain social categories in contrast to other social categories
(Turner 1999, p. 12).
Social identity is only a portion of the identity of a person; that portion the person shares
with others. However, when an individual makes an isolated decision in a DG without
knowing anything about the partner, it is not the individual’s social category what is
revealed in the decision, but his or her self-de￿nition or self-understanding as a unique
person, that is, a sel￿sh person, an egalitarian person, an altruist person, a charitable
person, and so on.
To the best of our knowledge, few economic experiments have been expressly conducted
on social and personal identity, and even fewer with dictator games. However, this is an
especially useful tool for analyzing individuals’ self-image when carrying out an action. In
the only work prior to ours on identity and giving behavior, Ben-Ner et al. (2006) show
how experimental subjects give more (hypothetical) money in a dictator game to those who
are similar to them in a wide range of social categories. Now, as we have said, in our case
5we do not want to analyze the subjects’ social identity in a DG, but their personal identity,
that is, if there is a link between self-de￿nition and giving (real) money in a dictator game.
To accomplish this end, in the following section we present a formal model -inspired in the
work of Akerlof and Kranton (2000)-, in which we consider that the subjects establish a
personal prescription that dictates how an amount of money should be divided in a DG.
Personal identity is thus de￿ned as the accommodation between what one does and the
prescription about what one says one should do. An experiment designed to explore the
main parameters of the model is presented in section 3. Given that contradictions arise
between what subjects do and what they say they should do, we establish a process of
self-understanding with a view to shedding some light on who attaches lesser weight to
personal identity and why and who attaches greater weight to personal identity and why.
The results of the experiment are discussed in the fourth section, where we warn of the
di￿culties of attributing identities to people when explaining economic behavior.
2 The model
Let us assume that a population of N individuals is playing a DG.1 Let S be the amount
of money to be divided, gi the amount donated by dictator i to a recipient, gi 2 [0;S], and
xi = S   gi the money she keeps. Following Akerlof and Kranton (2000), we assume that
subjects derive utility from the money they keep (consumption xi 2 [0;S]) and also from
a sense of personal identity, Ii:2
Ui = Ui(Ii;xi) (1)
1In a standard DG, one of the players, the dictator, is given a ￿xed amount of money. She is then told
that the money has been assigned to two players -the dictator and the recipient- but that only the dictator
is entitled to decide how much money to keep and how much money to give to the recipient.
2Akerlof and Kranton (2000, p. 719) propose a utility function where utility depends on one’s own
action, others’ action and identity. Since, in the DG, the second player does not make any decision, we
simplify the function making it only dependent on own consumption and identity.
6To model identity, Ii, ￿rst we de￿ne the PRESCRIPTION Pi as a normative principle for
each individual3 concerning how S should be shared Pi = (pii;pij), pii + pij = S. In the
rest of the paper, we refer to the personal prescription as the amount of money one should
keep, that is pii. Violating this prescription has a cost ci = jxi   piij which is symmetric
for upward or downward deviations from the prescription.
IDENTITY, then, is de￿ned as: Ii = I ci where I is a constant. Ii is the stock of identity
that an individual has and reaches its maximum value when subject i exactly follows her
prescription: xi = pii. When she does not follow it, she loses identity with respect to that
maximum stock.
Individuals decide their level of consumption and identity by solving the following prob-
lem:4
maxxi;IiUi = Ui(xi;Ii) (2)
s:t: : ci = (xi   pii) (3)
xi + gi = S (4)
We assume a trade-o￿ between identity and consumption. To capture this trade-o￿ for-







where i measures the relative weight given to identity in i’s preferences. We can substitute
restrictions (3) and (4) in the objective function and rewrite the maximization problem as:
3Note that, in contrast to other papers (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999), our
subjects are not compelled to follow any de￿ned principle, for instance the ‘equal split’ , the ‘minimum
di￿erence’, etc.
4Note that in this context it would not be rational for a subject to keep less than the amount indicated
by the prescription, so that we can ignore the case xi < pii. This allows us to write the restriction as
ci = (xi   pii).
7maxxi[I   (xi   pii)]ix
1 i
i (6)
From the FOC of this problem we obtain the optimal consumption:
xi = (1   i)[I + pii] (7)
Note that constraint (4) has to hold so that xi  S. For high values of the parameter I,
we could have a corner solution at xi = S. Thus,
xi = minf(1   i)(I + pii);S (8)
When xi < S, condition (7) characterizes the optimal solution.
The experiment described in the next section was designed to obtain the values xi and
pii for each individual. The observed values are denoted e xi and e pii. We assume that this
behavior is rational and comes from the solution of their individual optimization problems
(6). I is not observable but since in our data we have e xi < S for some i, I must be
such that it allows for interior solutions; therefore, we approximate I by e I = S
2, which is
consistent with the observed e xi and e pii for any value of i.
Substituting in (7) the values of e xi, e pii and e I, we can calculate for each subject the value of
i that makes the decisions consistent with the maximization of the Cobb-Douglas utility
function:
b i = 1  
e xi
[e I + e pii]
(9)
Note that the higher the value of e xi relative to the prescription e pii, the lower is the estimated
weight of identity in the utility function. Even with a di￿erent utility function, b i would
provide a reasonable measure of the weight given to identity relative to consumption in
the subject’s preferences.5
5An alternative formulation would be to consider that utility is dependent on consumption and identity
loss; for example, consider preferences Ui = (pii   xi)
ix
1 i
i . In this case b i = 1  
e xi
e pii.
8To sum up, the model provides a framework in which to measure the weight given to
identity in the utility function, i, using observable variables like consumption xi and
prescription pii. In the next section, we describe how xi and pii were obtained from the
experimental data, then we calculate the values b i and explore the determinants of the
weight given to identity.
3 The experiment
3.1 Experimental design and procedures
For the experiment, 78 undergraduate students were recruited (mainly Biology students)
at the Autonomous University of Southern Baja California (UABCS) in La Paz (Mexico)
in September 2006. Two experimental sessions were conducted (each one corresponding
to a di￿erent treatment).6 Students were recruited by a professor of Biology by means of
posters placed throughout the school. The message ‘Do you want to earn some money?’
appeared on all of the posters as well as an E-mail address for participants to sign up
for the experiment. The whole recruitment process was carried out the week prior to the
experiment (performed on Monday, September 25th).
Why did we choose Mexico? The reason for choosing the UABCS was that -as far as we
knew- no experiment had ever been run there. Thus, the whole population was completely
uninformed about dictators’ behavior and had no previous knowledge about it. We assumed
that this lack of information was strictly necessary to obtain clean results.
In the ￿rst session, 26 subjects played the game as dictators. The other 26 subjects,
who played as recipients, waited for half an hour and then came into the room (once the
dictators had left the room through another door). In the second session, only 26 subjects
acted as dictators since the potential donations were for a student association.
6The two treatments were designed to test if information about the recipient had an in￿uence on
dictators behavior. In the ￿rst treatment the recipient was an unknown student, whereas in the second
one the recipient was a real student association for the protection of the sea cucumber. Since there are
no di￿erences in the behavior and prescriptions between both groups (Mann-Whitney test; z =  0:028,
p = 0:978, for actual giving; z =  0:573, p = 0:567, for prescriptions), we can pool the data and analyze
it as a single sample.
9We used a very standard design in order to avoid words such as ‘sharing’ that could
trigger generous behavior.7 Furthermore, the subjects received clues indicating that they
were allowed to keep all the money. The exact procedure followed in the experiment is
presented below.
Dictators received a package including a large envelope which contained another small
envelope (for the dictators’ payo￿s), ten 20-Mexican peso bills each (or a total of 200 pesos
 = 15 US$  = 14¿), plus a questionnaire and instructions. The instructions explained the
division problem and indicated that the recipient would be randomly selected from among
the people waiting outside (alternatively a student association).
The instructions were read aloud to guarantee common understanding. The subjects were
then told to carry out the task privately with the help of the large envelope. They had
to transfer the money they wanted to keep into the small envelope, seal it and put it in
their pockets. Thus, the money they wished to donate (to the recipients) had to remain
inside the big envelope. Once the subjects had ￿nished the task, they ￿lled out a short
questionnaire (see appendix B). Among other questions, they were hypothetically asked:
‘What division do you think is the fairest?’ (item #3). This question is crucial for our
analysis, since we derive individual prescriptions from it. We explain below why we elicit
individual prescriptions in this way.
After this, they were asked to turn in the questionnaire and sign a blank receipt form.
They left the instructions and the large envelope (with the donation) on a table. While
the recipients were being asked to come in, the dictators proceeded to leave the room.
Communication among them was impossible.
It should be noted that our design has a clear order e￿ect, ￿rst participants make the
decision and then prescriptions are elicited. This order obviously may a￿ect the results:
subjects may accommodate prescriptions to actions. However, using the opposite order
could be even worse, since subjects would adequate their choices to previous declarations.
A related issue is that, precisely, analyzing the role of fairness once decisions have been
done makes a lot of sense if we want to calibrate how important identity is for individuals.
Thus, we decide to use this order.
7Instructions of the experiment can be sent upon request.
10Our subjects were also asked (item #4) about the behavior of the other participants, i.e.,
the average donation.Thus, we have for each individual: her donation, her prescription and
her expectation about others behavior (on average). We run a number of Wilcoxon tests
for paired samples. Interestingly, we ￿nd that givings and expected givings are identically
distributed (z =  0:746, p = 0:456), whereas prescriptions are not correlated with givings
(z =  4:56;p < 0:001) nor with expected givings (z =  4:334, p < 0:001). Therefore,
these tests indicate that:
￿ individuals believe that the other subjects behave as they did;
￿ prescriptions are not accommodated to actions.
Then we consider that our design is ‘clean’ and that the provided information is valuable.
Also recall that the experiment was doubleblind, so participants did not feel any pressure
to provide a ‘correct’ answer.
3.2 Experimental results
In the following, we present the results in a somewhat di￿erent way from the standard
literature on dictator games. We analyze mainly the variables consumption (xi), i.e. the
money actually kept by subjects, and prescription (pii), i.e. the self-reported individual
prescriptions about he money they should keep. We have 52 actions and 51 prescriptions
(1 null), respectivelly.
Figures 1a and 1b plot the actual behavior and the revealed prescriptions by the partici-
pants in the DG, respectively. Mainly, we can observe the contrast between the homogene-
ity of the sample shown in prescriptions and the heterogeneity of actual behaviors. Thus,
whereas most of the subjects (68.6%) report a prescription equal to 5, no general trend
is found regarding consumption behavior. Purely sel￿sh behavior is not clearly observed
since only 9 subjects out of 52 keep the whole amount of money. Neither is it possible to
speak about a general egalitarian behavior as only 12 out of the 52 participants donate 5,
far from the number of participants (35) that reveal this prescription.
INSERT FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
113.2.1 The weight of identity
We will now focus on the subjects’ utility function. Although the utility function is not
observable, we can derive the value for i for each subject by using the experimental
information for xi and pii (see equation (7) in section 2). Table 1 shows the i value for
all the participants in our experiment. Recall that i means the importance of identity in
the utility function.
The lack of homogeneity in the weight subjects assign to identity is a consequence of the
heterogeneity of behaviors (xi) and the stability of prescriptions (pii) in the population.
Note that the range of values that i adopts is determined by the type of utility function
that we use. Only ￿ve individuals give no value to identity, but twelve assign the highest
possible value. With the exception of 14 subjects (i < 0:25), participants value identity in
a very notable way. In other words, we can say that individual consumption is constrained
dramatically due to identity concerns. In fact, the mean i is 0.31, the median is 0.35 and
the mode 0.50.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Result 1: Most of the individuals give a possitive value to identity in their utility function.
3.2.2 Determinants of i
We have already shown that identity matters. In the following we are interested in studying
which are the main determinants of identity. For instance, the weight given to identity
may be related to individuals’ personal characteristics, socioeconomic variables or other
factors. Using data from the questionnaire the participants ￿lled after the experiment,
we can obtain some insights about the determinants of the weight given to identity (i).
We use a set of variables that includes: questions related to the self-understanding of
participants (sel￿sh and cooperative), socio-demographic variables (sex, income, siblings),
and social capital variables (club and NGO).
The sel￿sh variable refers to a question in which the subjects are asked to de￿ne the situ-
ation as one in which they maximize their own welfare or the welfare of both participants,
12that is the dictator and the recipient. This variable ranges from 1 to 7: 1 meaning maximize
joint (me + recipient) welfare a lot and 7 meaning maximize my own welfare a lot.
The cooperative variable is derived from the participants’ answers to a question in which
they are asked to state if they perceive themselves as competing or cooperating with their
partners in this game. This variable ranges from 1 to 7: 1 meaning competing a lot and 7
meaning cooperating a lot.
We estimate the e￿ect of the above-mentioned variables in i using censored data models
(Tobit). We present two models, one including the variable sel￿sh and one including the
variable cooperative.8
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
The most salient result is that no socio-demographic variable -neither sex, income, siblings-
explains the weight that the subjects give to identity, whereas participating in clubs in-
creases weakly the weight of the identity in the utility function. Variables regarding self-
understanding are clearly relevant. On the one hand, sel￿sh subjects who consider that
their own income is more important than joint social welfare give less weight to identity.
On the other hand, cooperative subjects give more weight to identity, according to their
own taste for cooperation.
Result 2: The weight given to identity in a standard DG depends on personal self-
understanding variables and it is not correlated to socio-demographic nor social capital
variables.
3.2.3 Arguments provided by subjects
If self-understanding is so important in explaining actual behavior in the DG, we should
be interested in knowing the reasons behind this self-understanding. In what follows we
explore the reasons given by participants when asked to rationalize their behavior. We
8The high correlation between these two variables (  = :0:336;p = 0:016) recommends not including
both of them in the same model.
13hypothesized that these reasons are the key arguments that contribute to individuals’ self-
understanding.9
We have just shown that individuals’ self-understanding plays a crucial role in the weight
subjects give to identity (i). After completing the questionnaire, the subjects were asked
to explain their decisions regarding their donation in the DG. We now explore the reasons
self-reported by subjects when they have to rationalize their actual behavior. From the
whole set of answers we de￿ne four groups of reasons. These groups are labelled as follows
and include a representative comment by the subjects in each case as an example.
￿ ‘Equity’ (n=14 subjects): An example of ‘equity’ reasoning is the following: ‘Taking
all the money is not fair, so I consider that taking 50% is enough and acceptable.’
￿ ‘Sel￿shness’ (n= 13 subjects): ‘...because I always want more for me.’
￿ ‘Hardship’ (n=13 subjects): ‘...because at this moment I’m hungry and I only have
$50 for the next 2 weeks. I know that my decision is not fair but I took it anyway.’
￿ ‘Charity’ (n=4 subjects): ‘...I consider myself a religious person, I don’t believe in
the Church but I believe in God, and He asked me to give between 10% and 20% to
charity. My decision is giving the highest quantity without a￿ecting my economy.’
Figure 2 plots the reported prescription (pii) and the amount of money the dictator kept
(xi) by groups.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The ￿rst idea that arises from this ￿gure is the contrast between the homogeneity in pre-
scriptions and behaviors among ‘equitable’ people and the heterogeneity in both variables
in the other three groups. Interestingly, there is no variability at all in the ‘Equity’ group.
These individuals have a clear idea about the prescription and almost all of them follow it.
9Aguiar et al. (2008) provide an exhaustive analysis of self-reported reasons for giving behavior in the
DG.
14The group of ‘sel￿sh’ individuals is completely di￿erent. They show a notable variability
in self-reported prescriptions and also heterogeneity in relation to the money they keep.
The median value is to keep 90% of the endowment, thus half of the ‘sel￿sh’ group keeps
the whole money. Subjects who declare that they need the money (‘Hardship’ group)
accommodate the prescription to their own interest or to the need they manifest to have,
while the ‘Charity’ group follows, on average, their prescription.10
In sum, self-reported arguments indicate that:
Result 3a: In the case of ‘Equity’ subjects’ behavior and prescription almost always ￿t.
Result 3b: Subjects that allude to reasons other than ‘Equity’ show heterogeneous pre-
scriptions and behaviors. In this case, the behavior and the prescription of what should
be done do not always coincide.
4 Discussion
Under the in￿uence of sociology and social psychology, particularly social identity theory,
the growing literature on economics and identity has centered more on the concept of
social identity than on the concept of personal identity. In the most in￿uential study to
date, that of Akerlof and Kranton, identity is considered a process of social categorization.
Identity, or sense of self, has to do with the (not always conscious) accommodation of
individual action to the categories that others attribute to individuals. These categories
are presented in the form of prescriptions or codes of conduct. Hence, an Afro-American
woman from New York with two children who is a professor of literature and a feminist,
for example, would have a drawer full of labels -woman, Afro-American, mother, professor,
feminist- that would all ￿t provided that she attempts to accommodate her conduct to
the various prescriptions that determine the ideal behavior of these categories. Yet, can
that person’s behavior, her economic and non-economic conduct be explained in terms of
10A quantitative measure of the coherency shown by each of these groups of individuals is the average
cost (ci), that is the di￿erence between what individuals in each group say they should do ( pii) and what
they actually do (xi). The average cost of the sel￿sh group is 1.75, whereas the average cost of the equitable
group is only .14. The ‘Hardship’ and ‘Charity’ groups show intermediate costs, 1.38 and 1.00 respectively.
15these labels? To a large extent it can be, but not without a wide margin of discretion.
As we said in the introduction, it is not easy to establish causal ties between identity and
action and even less so when identity is attributed to large population groups (Hispanics,
Blacks, Afro-Americans, Muslims). Consequently, there are those who prefer to talk about
identi￿cation with values, interests and desires, of self-understanding or of personal identity
rather than social identity.
Although we have not rejected the usefulness of the concept of social identity in this
article, we believe that it is necessary to give some account of the bearers of a set of social
identities. With this aim, we have focused on personal identity in a standard dictator
game, that is, in a context where social distance is large with respect to the subjects’
social identities and where personal identity is revealed with great clarity. By doing so,
we have demonstrated that it is not an easy task to attribute identities to individuals, not
even in such an apparently simple context as that of the DG. Our experiment has produced
the following results.
1. Incoherency between conduct and prescription. In order to keep within the conceptual
framework established by Akerlof and Kranton, while bearing in mind the literature
on personal identity, we have considered that one of the key elements of the concept
is the coherency between what one actually does and what one says should be done
(personal identity). Identities that people attribute to themselves turn out to be
unsustainable in the long run if that person does nothing that the identity prescribes.
Clearly, the person who says ‘I’m altruist’ would have an ideal about what that
label prescribes and will judge her action according to this self-prescription. In our
experiment, however, actual conduct and the prescription belong to two di￿erent
worlds since while a minority does in e￿ect donate half of the money to the recipient,
the majority states that they should donate half.
2. The weight given to identity is highly heterogeneous. When instead of attributing
identities to large population groups, we descend to the level of individual decisions
as we have done here, we ￿nd that the weight individuals give to identity is very
heterogeneous. Common codes of conduct do not, by any means, exist; a fact which
has to do with how individuals understand themselves.
163. The weight of identity has to do with individuals’ self-understanding. The regression
analysis has shown that the weight of identity (i) is correlated with the image
subjects have of themselves. In an initial process of self-understanding, we asked the
subjects to de￿ne themselves as being either sel￿sh (e￿ciency minded) or cooperative
(competitive). This self-understanding turns out to be key to understanding the
weight that individuals attach to identity.
4. Individuals who play the DG on sel￿sh terms show less coherency between action and
prescription, while individuals who consider themselves to be equitable show greater
coherency. Given that we have de￿ned personal identity ￿ la Akerlof-Kranton as
the accommodation between action and prescription (personal prescription in our
case), the fact that a person manifests sel￿sh values in a DG does not mean that
they attach less weight to identity. Personal identity is the coherency between what
is given and what one says should be given. The sel￿sh individual gives the same
weight to identity as the non-sel￿sh individual when action and prescription coincide.
However, in a subsequent process of self-understanding in which subjects were asked
to give reasons for their actions, it is striking that the sel￿sh subjects are the least
coherent, whereas the equitable subjects are the most coherent.
All of this casts doubts on the concept of identity and on the generalized identities that are
attributed to individuals. It is very likely that these attributions conceal interests, beliefs
and desires that go further in explaining conduct than the very identity itself (Aguiar and
de Francisco 2009). Furthermore, as several experimental and non-experimental studies
have shown, group pressure -which does not exist in our experiment- can force individuals
to align with others around identity because it is bene￿cial to them or because they are
obliged to do so. Unquestionably, the concept of identity should continue to play an
explanatory role in economics and other social sciences given that there are clear cases in
which this concept is the driving force behind individuals’ decisions. Nonetheless, when
descending to the level of personal identity, several contradictions arise that oblige us to be
cautious when attributing identities to people and attempting to explain economic conduct
in terms of these identities.
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23i values N % cum %
.00 5 9.6 9.8
.10 4 7.7 17.6
.20 5 9.6 27.5
.25 1 1.9 29.4
.30 4 7.7 37.3
.31 1 1.9 39.2
.33 4 7.7 47.1
.36 6 11.5 58.8
.38 2 3.8 62.7
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.42 2 3.8 76.5
.50 12 23.1 100.0
Total 51 100.0












Table 2: Determinants of i
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